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1 Fairness and equity concerns 
Electricity access is generally accepted as vital for improving living conditions of poor households. 
Whether the price of electricity supplied or the access in the first place is the most important is unclear. It 
is probable that access should be prioritised even if it involves very high consumer prices.  
With the isolated structure of distribution networks in Cambodia, this involves having very large 
differences in actual electricity prices at the moment. In a long term perspective this must be considered 
unfair and in direct contrast to distributional objectives of supplying electricity to poor households at 
affordable rates. This priority should be included in the long term objectives and implemented in also the 
renewable energy projects. However, this objective should not be a barrier to rural electricification and the 
implementation of renewable energy projects. The possibility of charging higher tariffs in isolated rural 
areas is one of the characteristics that would make the renewable energy projects viable (profitable).  
From the renewable energy point it is therefore possible that higher energy tariffs should be approved 
under the condition that renewable energy solutions are chosen. As they have generally higher capital costs 
than conventional technologies high electricity tariffs, which are gradually reduced would be a competitive 
advantage to renewable technologies.   
The prospect of falling tariffs would contribute to the fairness objective by narrowing the gap between 
consumer prices in urban and rural areas whitout compromising the possibility for electrification in the 
first place. The degree of uncertainty over future tariffs will be less for the renewable technologies as the 
variable costs (fuel) is much less than for the conventional technologies. This property would also 
contribute to the fairness objective, by reducing the price risk for poor households.  
It is probably just as important to secure long term availability of reasonable priced electricity locally than 
to have just as low tariffs as in the urban areas from the first day of operation. The access to electricity will 
be seen as a progress and the following gradual reduction of tariffs will be seen as continued progress. 
Access to electricity will be much more important than the actual price You have to pay for a low 
concumption of electricity as an incentive for people to stay in the rural areas. 
More radical equity objectives will have to involve subsidy elements and in the case of renewable energy 
this could target the investment cost and thereby lowering the initial tariff requirements.    
2 Development objectives 
The pricing policy of promoting development in rural areas by supplying electricity to small-scale industry 
at affordable rates is an indirect measure to support working opportunities in rural areas.  
For the agricultural sector access to electricity could improve revenues from products by allowing local 
initial processing and storage, pumping of water etc. The actual cost of electricity is agin less important 
than just having the access. For larger processing facilities the question of competitiveness relative to other 
producers in areas with access to cheaper electricity becomes more important.   
For the larger agriculturing processing activities and for industrial activity a policy of supporting these also 
in remote rural areas by subsidising their electricity tariff will not be sustainable in the long run. 
The question of tariff differences between consumer categories is also an important issue for the renewable 
energy projects. Equity concerns would tend to favour low tariffs for poor households with low electricity 
  
 
 
             
consumption. If cross-subsidising from commercial and industrial use to residential use is requested, then 
the development objective could be compromised in the way that less commercial/industrial activity will 
be developed and in the end this would produce less employment opportunities for the population in these 
areas. Cross subsidising the commercial and industrial use at the expense of households would on the other 
hand be difficult to implement and would also be unfair to the very small-scale production activities taking 
place in the household. 
An existing processing/industrial facility becoming an electricity producer will probably have a major part 
of the profitability of the project from its own savings. It is not possible to assign a specific price to this 
electricity consumer that differs from the price offered to others. However, if the project is profitable by 
assigning the same price to its own electricity consumption (or the reduction in purchased electricity/fuel)) 
then the renewable project will contribute to the overall profitability of the company. The power 
production involvement can thus cross-subsidise the other activities of the company. The arrangement 
wont create an inefficiency problem because the alternative option of selling the electricity in the market 
would be balanced against the revenue generated by using the electricity in its own production.    
Actually the investment in a renewable energy project would make the existing production more 
competitive and could contribute to the local development goal.  
The importance for health and education of having access to electricity should also be considered as a 
possible development gain.    
3 Regulation and approval of tariffs 
The Cambodian system of licensing and approving the tariffs of new licensees involves the opportunity to 
allowe different tariffs for specific technologies such as renewable energy based. In principle the cost-
recovery option is securing that the technology with lowest costs is the most competitive if there are 
competitors in  the market to supply electricity. If there is only one supplier actively seeking a license to 
put up new electricity producing capacity, then he might just as well chose a technology that have higher 
costs on average but lower marginal costs in the longer term where it is more likely that he might be 
exposed to competition. From an efficiency point of view this does not secure that the cheapest production 
technology is implemented. 
Renewable energy can be favorised in this system of regulating licenses and tariffs if the authorities are 
initiating or supporting the new applications for licenses involving renewable technologies. It is possible to 
approve tariffs for renewable projects with higher costs than electricity procuction based on fossil fuels.   
  
Cost covering 
In the EAC regulation of tariffs the basic principle is the right to fully cover production and distribution 
costs. With isolated grids this involves large variation in production and distribution costs within the 
country and thus in the tariffs the population have to pay. This is however necessary to have any incentive 
to private participation in the extension of grids and electricity supply in remote areas. Otherwise the 
population and businesses located in areas with low costs of production and supply would have to 
subsidies electricity consumers in more remote areas.   
Cost covering in local grid-systems without competition would allow favoring more expensive renewable 
energy production backed by other favorurable characteristics. This could however be combined with, 
obligations to reduce tariffs in the longer term. This would secure that tariffs in the longer term does not 
exceed the expected tariff levels of fossil fuel based electricity. This option is further explored below. 
  
Cross-subsidy allowed 
Cross subidies among consumer groups are allowed and there is no restriction on the costs of supplying 
relative to the tariff for consumer categories. As there are examples of cross-subsidising towards low-
income consumer groups in the Pnohm Penh there does not seem to be any obstacles to having a cross-
subsidy in the other direction. For specific projects it is possible to allow the project initiater to benefit in 
indirectly paying a much lower price for own electricity consumption than the customers in a mini-grid 
that it is supplying.  
  
 
 
             
This possible element of cross-subsidy should be limited, but to have the incentive to undertake the 
renewable project in the first place there need to be some profit (or reduced implicit electricity price) for 
the project initiater.     
The REF support in the form of grants seem to be unrelated to the tariff structure of the electricity sales 
from the new licensee. It should be secured, that the project is not cross-subsidising the project initiater in 
exsess of the necessary saving (profit) to make the project worthwile to undertake in the first place. 
Therefore any possible difference in tariffs should not exeed the corresponding difference in the cost of 
supplying the different customers.    
4 Specific elements of tariff structure in relation to RE projects 
 
Tariff structure can be simple or it can include several fixed and variable elements as well as time of use 
based, peak based or location based elements. Some of these are less relevant for low-income rural areas 
but others should be considered to be allowed in these areas as they could reduce the uncertainty of future 
demand or reduve the investment costs relative to the supplied electricity. The more complex tariff 
structure the larger is however the possibility of distorting the use from the most efficient use of a given 
supply of electricity. Massive subsidy of residential consumption (the variable part) should be avoided 
relative to the industrial use. If residential consumption is to be subsidised it should be by subsidising part 
of the fixed tariff element or the initial connection costs. 
 
Fixed tariff elements 
A fixed tariff element is intended to capture the costs of maintaining the connection and the registration of 
the individual consumer. The fixed element can also be set to cover the initial connection costs and a part 
of the grid costs.  
As the rural areas to a large extent will be dominated by low-income low-volume customers a fixed tariff 
element would result in very high price level pr kWh actually consumed. The fixed tariff would also be a 
disincentive to consume in the first place, and could thus be an obstacle to the rural electricification in 
itself. The fixed tariff element will therefore often be transferred to higher tariffs on the electricity 
consumed. This would disfavour the larger consumers that have lower costs of supply than the smaller 
customers and is one argument for the lower tariffs for the larger consumers. 
Fixed tariff elements on the other hand can be a way of financing the connection costs of households. If 
connection/rural electricification is part of a project then the fixed tariff can allow households the financing 
for connection that they are possibly not able to obtain from other sources.    
 
Metering costs and time of use tariffs 
Real time pricing seems irrelevant for a rural electricification project as this market oriented facility is 
most efficient if there are many adjustment options on the supply side and very different value assigned to 
consumption at specific time for different consumers.  
Time of use tariffs is probably also irrelevant as the higher metering costs are exceeding the gains from 
shifting consumption from one time period to another. The majority of residential consumption in rural 
areas is probably at times where industrial (agricultural) related consumption is low and the major part 
cannot be shifted to other hours. A possible gain could be achieved if there is industrial consumption at 
peak times of residential demand. This could be relevant if the industrial demand is mainly drying/cooling 
or pumping, which to a large extent can be shifted from the peak hour. In this case it could be relevant to 
charge a large customer less in the off-peak hours and more than the residential customers in the peak 
hours. Time of use tarfiffs does not seem relevant for residential demand until this has a large proportion of 
air-conditioning, which will not be the case in the low-income rural areas. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
             
Advance payments 
The use of advance payments either as a way to reduce losses or as a way to increase predictability of 
consumption is especially relevant where there is less control with collecting revenues or the costs of 
collecting would also be high. In rural low-income areas the ability to pay electricity consumed during a 
longer period will be very fluctuating. The households will very seldom have savings to eliminate the 
effect of fluctuations in income and the risk of defaulting on electricity bills will therefore be high. Instead 
of the initial requirement of advance payment, which will certainly reduce demand and make the whole 
project less viable the advance payment requirement could be replaced by some pool of funds garantying 
the payment of the first year bills. If this is brought about as a subsidy or grant rather than from ordinary 
tariffs this would reduce the vital uncertainty of collected revenues from the initial year of operation. This 
subsidy should only be at a size giving partial protection from expexted losses from non-collection. 
Interruption of supply by non-ability to pay will have to be in place.      
With interruptable connection and metering equipment the funds to buy the electricity at the time of 
requisted use is possible and this does not imply having to pay a large amount to secure the supply for a 
longer period (a year). This way of advance payment is not reducing the expected demand as much as the 
up front payment of one year of electricity consumption, but it is rather costly in respect of the equipment 
and also involves collecting costs. 
 
Volume dependent tariffs 
Higher volumes of electricity has lower supply costs as there are fixed cost elements of supplying. 
Reflecting cost differences in the tariff is the optimal solution from an effcieicncy point of view, but can be 
in conflict with distributional concerns. Both elements seem to be incorporated in the tariff structure in 
place for the Pnomh Penh region (see next section)  
A secondary reason for existence of this difference is the the degree of competition in market segments. 
Larger customers are normally more exposed to competion among the suppliers driving down the tariff 
these customers are charged relative to the smaller customers. For the larger consumers there is a tendency 
that customers more frequently review possible supply options and prices and the suppliers will therefore 
reduce their tariffs to match their competitors.  
This would result in the lower tariffs for larger customers and even lower than the cost differences could 
justify. In rural areas this could be just as pronounced as there is probably not as much competition as 
some other places, but the larger consumers will have other elements of bargaining power/local influence. 
The residential consumers possibly does not have thi kind of bargaining power and will have to take the 
offered tariff. Therefore there has to be a review securing that the larger customers are not offered too large 
a discount relative to the residential consumers. Some variation in tariff based on level of consumption 
should be allowed in the review of proposed tariff for the rural electrification projects. 
  
Long term supply contracts 
In the rural areas with new electricification projects it is very difficult to project the electricity demand and 
this induce a major risk to the profitability to all electricity projects. The larger the dependence of 
electricity supplied to a new grid relative to the possible own use, the larger is the uncertainty of total 
revenues within the project. One way to overcome this problem or reduce the risk on the demand side is to 
make long term contracts with take or pay elements (minimum consumption) with a few larger potential 
customers. This would involve contracts with some discount, but it might be combined with giving higher 
degree of security of supply garanties than to other (residential customers). In some cases local authorities 
or institutions would be large enough customers to enter these types of agreement. In the case of renewable 
production with relatively stable production costs in the long term the price risk for the consumer (local 
small scale industry) this could involve quite a reduction in cost risk for its electricity supply if the 
uncertainty is biased in the direction of future demand exceeding the production capacity of the given (or 
possible) renewable project. Thus there could be possible benefits of these types of contract for both 
consumer and supplier. The problem with these are that the competition for the most productive use of the 
electricity generated is reduced (some proportion of production is taken of the market).   
 
  
 
 
             
Connection tariffs 
Rural area electrification projects will in most cases involve the construction of entire new mini-grids or 
replacement of smaller grids. Households in these areas are often incapable of paying/financing their 
connection costs. Therefore the intial grid including connections will have to be seen as one package that 
need to be financed by the producer/distribution entity. This part of the investment is the most relevant part 
to subsidise relative to the investment in generation equipment or the actual electricity consumption. 
Subsidising investment in generation could lead to overinvestment and subsidising consumption could lead 
to consumption levels where the marginal utility of use is exceeding the marginal costs of production.  
Because of the lack of funds in households the connection tariffs will largely have to be covered by the 
electricification project itself or by a subsidy. If not subsidised it must be recovered through the tariff for 
the electricity consumption. If the project involves subsidies/grants it is relevant to subsidise connection 
costs, but a fraction of these costs should be borne by the consumer to secure that only consumers with a 
minimum of expected consumption are being connected.   
5 Off grid renewable generation 
Off grid renewable generation involves comparing with much more expensive alternative options from 
conventional production/existing facilities.  This makes it easier for the renewable technologies to compete 
and in many cases the renewable technologies should be able to generate and supply at lower tariffs than 
are used in the isolated areas already as they are supplied by very inefficient diesel based systems. 
The two main problems for the RE projects are the high investment costs and the relative unknown 
technology to the people in these areas. Support to promote the rewable technologies could include a 
number of tariff related options of which the majority are mentioned in the previous section: 
 
• High initially allowed tariffs with following tariff reduction 
• Support as grants to the grid investment/connection costs 
• Partial grants to the investment in the RE technology 
• Garanties for minium revenue from electricity sales (or buffer fund to allow sales without advance 
payments) when sales and/ore revenue collection is uncertain 
• Allowing long term contract with larger customers at lower prices than what households pay 
• Allowing priority to larger customers with regard to security of supply and transforming this 
difference to reduced difference in the tariff paid by the residential and large consumers  
• Support to handling procedures to secure the financing from CDM  
 
If the case is entirely a generation project then the viability of the project could be assured by some PPA 
securing a long term profitability of the RE project. At the current diesel prices and diesel based generation 
costs in remote areas, the RE projects will often be competitive at the average production costs but it isvital 
for the project to secure the long term rates. A PPA with a tariff for the next 15 years will be more 
important than a subsidy as a higher feed in tariff than diesel based generation. It is important to garanty 
that the price can be obtained also in the case where the local grid is becoming connected to a larger grid.     
One of the uncertainties regarding the competition from other generation in isolated grids is probably the 
long term prospects for having these grids connected with national grids or larger regional grids. Such a 
development would pose a thread to the otherwise high feed in tariffs that can be obtained in the isolated 
grids.  
For efficiency reasons the investment costs should not have too high a share of subsidy/grant element as 
this would tend to lead to overinvestment and investments in projects that are not the most efficient given 
the size of potential demand. 
 
  
 
 
             
6 On grid renewable generation  
For RE connected to larger grids the price level for generation is much lower because of the larger 
generation units in the system and the inclusion of cheaper technologies than the disel based generators in 
the remote grids. Therefore RE projects of comparable size as those in the remote areas will be more 
exposed to competition. One of the major question in this respect is the competition relative to the larger 
hydroprojects already underway and planned. The subsidy element must therefore be expected to be more 
pronounced here unless CDM is making it favourable anyway.  
On grid renewable generation will have to be compared to EDC marginal generation costs. This result in 
comparing the renewable projects with the proposed hydro projects of EDC and IPP’s long term marginal 
costs. This would result in rather unfavourable tariffs for buy back rates from renewable projects compared 
to the off grid projects. With this in mind it should be considered to which extent a premium from the 
small renewable projects relative to the large hydro projects should be given. It will be difficult to argue 
that the premium should be based on these small scale facilities being available at peak load. Also the 
alternative option of importing hydro based generation from e.e. Laos should put a limit on the level of 
subsidy for these small RE generator. PPA’s with a fixed price could be compared relative to a agreements 
that include some demand dependent fluctuation in the price to allow for efficient dispatch also in a future 
generation setup with more independent generators. 
For efficiency reasons the subsidy element should be rather limited as the competing technology seems to 
be the larger hydro projects that are characterised by the same degree of substituting imported fossil fuel 
and reducing the energy related emissions. 
 
EXISTING TARIFF STRUCTURE 
The existing tariff structure in Cambodia is mainly represented by the structure of tariffs in the area 
supplied by EDC. Tariffs in other areas are in general at higher levels and it is not possible to transfer the 
tariff structure of the EDC area to all areas of Cambodia. For many reasons a simpler tariff structure would 
often be chosen for the smaller supply areas.  
 
Tariff structure in EDC supply area 
The EDC tariff structure reflects cross-subsidies among consumer groups. Contrary to many countries that 
favour industrial users competing in export markets, there is a cross subsidy towards the low-income 
households. There are other countries in the SE Asian region exhibiting the same tendency as seen in the 
next section. 
  
 
 
             
Table 1: Tarif variation: EDC’s Electricity Tariff in Phnom Penh and Kandal Province 
Category of Customer Description Riels/kWh Relative to 
average 
Rural tariff 
with EDC 
structure 
(US cent) 
Domestic 0 - 50 kWh/month 350 55% 16.4 
51 – 100 kWh/month 550 86% 25.8 
More than 100 kWh/month  650 102% 30.5 
     
Government institutions   700 109% 32.8 
Embassy, NGO, Foreigner’s 
residence 
 800 
125% 37.5 
Commercial and service sector Small 650 102% 30.5 
Medium  600 94% 28.1 
Big 700 109% 32.8 
Medium voltage 800 125% 37.5 
Industrial Small 600 94% 28.1 
Medium  550 86% 25.8 
Big 500 78% 23.4 
Medium voltage 480 75% 22.5 
Average (16 US cents/kWh )  640 100%  
Rural projects tariff (US cent)  30 188%  
Calculated from Table 4-7 in : “Markets, Policies and Institutions”. 
Original Source: Electricity Authority of Cambodia, 2004. 
 
Based on the tariff structure reported in table 1 report the bottom residential tariff is only 44% of the 
highest commercial tariff. This is a massive subsidy of low-income households in the urban areas. As their 
consumption does not constitute such a large fraction of total demand this is possible in the EDC supply 
area.  Some of the differences in the tariff structure seems less well justified by distributional concerns as 
there does not seem to be any reason for the high rate for commercial at medium voltage. 
A revision of the tariff structure has been undertaken recently to pass on the variation of the purchase price 
of EDC in the tariffs charged for medium to large commercial and industial customers. They will be 
charged at a flat rate, which is however adjusted a number of times annual (monthly). This simplification 
seems reasonable with regard to reducing the difference among the different size commercial and industrial 
customers. 
The problem about extending this tariff structure to the rural areas is that a majority of the possible 
customers will belong to the group of residential customers with low consumption and therefore entitled to 
the lowest tariff level (45% discount) off all consumers. In the urban areas this customer group will only 
constitute a minor share of sales, but in some of the rural areas they might constitute more than half of the 
potential sales. Correspondingly the commercial and industrial tariff levels would even further discourage 
the location of processing activities requiring electricity input in the rural areas. The competitive situation 
for processing and therefore employment in rural areas relative to urban areas would be even worse than if 
the tariff is flat in the rural areas. 
Therefore it must be considered to allow the tariff structure to be less complicated in rural areas and to 
offer less discount to the residential sector. Subsidies for these low-income groups should instead be 
targeted at providing the access to electricity for the population or reducing the overall cost of supplying 
electricity. 
As the present tariffs in rural areas range from high to extremely high (up to 4000 riels/kWh) setting up 
new projects including RE would in the longer term always lead to reduced tariffs and be an improvement 
to the rural households. On the other hand it should be secured that residential customers are not 
  
 
 
             
discrimated by being charged much higher tariffs than the commercial and industrial customers. A flat rate 
for all customers is therefore to be preferred. 
Figure 1 shows the correlation between tariff rates and installed capacity. Rural tariff variation is very 
high. This leaves room for a lot of tariff reduction potential by retrofitting, conventional technologies and 
even RE. The problem is what the benchmark should be for comparing the proposed tariffs in new 
projects. Should RE projects be favorised by comparing to the highest levels of tariff in rural areas or 
should they only be compared to the existing tariff in the nearest area where there is existing supply? If 
tariff rates of above 3000 Riels /kWh are used nearly all possible technologies will be very profitable if the 
uncertainties regarding collection/payment of bills and technical production conditions are eliminated. 
 
 
Figure 1 Tariffs and Installed Capacities (reproduced from Figure 4-3 in Markets, Policies and Institutions ): 
 
However it is reasonable to expect considerable reduction in the rural tariffs compared to the highest 
levels. Tariffs above 1500 riels/ kWh should be ruled out even if the cost calculations of projects seem to 
back such rates. At levels of 1500 riels/kwh approval of projects should be dependent on including a 
specified future reduction of tariffs. The efficiency problem about too high rates are that they are creating 
incentives to use alternative sources (other fuel, own generators) that again might tend to undermine the 
project viability by reducing effective demand. 
Tariffs in international comparison 
As already mentioned the Cambodian tariffs are very high in international comparison. The following 
Table 2 shows the large variation among neighboring countries as well as the high tariffs for Cambodia. 
Country Residential Commercial Industry 
Brunei Darussalam  2.96 - 14.88 3.03 -11.91 2.972 -11.91 
Cambodia 8.41 - 15.62 14.41-15.62 11.53 - 14.42 
Indonesia 1.50 - 4.11 2.47 - 5.05 1.52 - 3.91 
Lao PDR  0.39 - 2.73 3.0 - 3.74 2.52 
Malaysia 5.40 - 8.73 2.57 - 10.27 2.57 - 10.27 
Myanmar 7.32 7.32 7.32 
Philippines 3.29 - 11.20 3.84 - 10.31 3.50 - 11.34 
Singapore 9.82 4.71 - 7.64 4.44 - 7.12 
Thailand 3.45 - 7.56 2.97 - 7.56 2.97 - 7.21 
Vietnam 2.73 - 7.65 3.97 - 13.08 2.65 - 13.08 
Source: www.aseanenergy.org/publication/electricity_prices.htm  
Table 2 Regional comparison of electricity tariffs (Countries 2005 (in US$)) 
  
 
 
             
 
The tariff comparison does only include the interval for each consumer category. The comparison shows 
that the Cambodian tariffs are the highest in the region for industry and commercial sectors. For the 
neighbours Thailand and Laos the corresponding tariffs are considerably lower. For the residential sector 
the tariff is also above other countries in the region, but it is unclear to which extend as the lower bound of 
the interval is below the upper bound in a few of the other countries.   
The comparison shows that the appropriate tariff to compare against in som new projects might just as well 
be competing imports from neighbors than the existing tariff in Cambodia or even the costs of new 
hydroprojects within Cambodia. 
 
Generation and PPA tariffs 
As a large fraction of the electricity sales in the EDC area (Pnomh Penh) is based on IPP generation and 
PPA’s this would constitute an important tariff to compare against in the evaluation of new RE projects 
that are to supply power to the larger grids either in regional towns or in Pnomh Penh region. So far no 
information on the exact tariffs in these PPA’ are available but they should be used in the EAC evaluation 
of new generation licensees and possible funding. As these are of relative large size and in the large grid 
these rates will probably be lower than what is becessary for the RE projects. The possible tariffs to be 
used by RE projects as the 1MW facility in the feasibility studies should be compared to the agreements 
regarding the new hydro projects as well. Therefore the RE projects should be entitled to at least the rates 
in the existing PPA’s and that shoud be without deducting anything for lower availability of the small-scale 
RE projects. 
 
Tariff structure in Cambodia and incentives for investment in RE in rural areas 
The tariff structure in place involves cross-subsidies favorising low-income urban households as described 
above. The higher tariffs allowed in rural areas without the restriction of having to cross-subsidise towards 
low-income households in these areas results in a better incentive structure here.    
The  high tariff levels in rural areas is an incentive for investors, but on the other hand this is a disincentive 
in the form of reducing the potential demand from the poor rural households. Therefore it is difficult to 
establish a  grids that are efficient in the way of distributing enough electricity to actually finance the grid 
investment. If totally privately financed the grid and connection costs would not be profitable and the risk 
is that the project is entirely scaled to match the consumption of the investor himself or a few larger 
consumers. 
Therefore the subsidies would be better allocated to the grid and connection costs than to subsidise the 
generation investment as the RE projects in many cases are profitable by itself at facilities having some 
existing electricity demand. 
The advantage of having high tariffs on the other hand increases the incentive for efficient generation and 
for the collection of actual consumption payments. If the subsidy is instead given to reduce generation 
equioment costs there is less incentive to make the generation and sales as large as possible. A subsidy to 
the feed-in tariff would relate subsidy to actual output, but no incentives would then be in place to secure 
that distribution and grid maintenance where working properly. This is just as important for the the local 
residents to benefit as having lower tariffs. 
An arrangement with high initially allowed tariffs and a sliding scheme has the additional advantage that 
the investor has an additional incentive to secure that grid and distribution works efficient from the 
beginning and that potential consumers have assess immediately. 
7 Feasibility studies and revenue simulations 
The feasibility studies have identified a number of RE based cases with promising characteristics and with 
attractive financial results for potential investors. This chapter is examining different assumptions and 
options regarding tariff levels, structure and output distribution.  
For this two of the feasibility cases have been further explored which include one off grid facility with own 
consumption and own on grid facility primarily producing for feed-in to a larger grid. 
  
 
 
             
   
Off grid generation with own consumption 
This case is based on the feasibility study of a 200 kW  methan-fired power generation plant and explores 
further on the volume of sales to the mini-grid and assumptions on the end-user tariff. 
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Figure 2 Feasibility study 200 kW  methan-fired power generation plant 
 
Figure 2 is reflecting the base case for the assumptions and only shows sensitivity to price and volume of 
electricity sales. This shows that the project profitability is robust against much lower sales prices and also 
lower sales volume. For the high volume case which is the base case the sensitivity to electricity price for 
the entire project is relatively high, but the project would be profitable even without the electricity sales at 
all. In this case the fuel savings associated with existing own electricity production and consumption is 
substantial enough to secure profitability.  
The investment in the mini grid and the expansion from 100 kW to 200kW will in this case have to be 
weighed against the chance of having either the CER revenues or the electricity sales revenue.  
 
Off grid generation and a sliding tariff  
  
Another option than just reducing the allowed maximum end-user tariff to 0.15 USD/kWh is to approve a 
sliding tariff as mentioned as an option in the sections above. To illustrate this a sliding tariff starting from 
the 0.3 USD/kWh used as the base case in this feasibility study and reduced by 5% annually. 
This would result in the a much more favourable profitability response to the lower prices. The IRR is only 
reduced around 5% points in the base case for sale of 400,000 kWh even though the price after 15 years 
drop as low as 0.07 USD kWh. For a more realistic reduction from 0.30 to 0.15 USD/kWh the effect is 
barely seen. This is partly a result of the high discount rates used in the calculation that gives much less 
weight to the revenue generated 15 years from the investment. High initial tariffs could thus help finance 
the investment and at the same time a gradual improvement for households is given in reducing their 
electricity bill or allowing them to increase their consumption. The effect to the IRR of requiring a constant 
price of 0.15 USD/kWh woul be to reduce IRR from 53% to 33% much more drastic than with the sliding 
tariff. 
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Figure 3 Using a sliding scale for electricity sales prices 
 
The idea of using a sliding scale for the allowed electricity sales price include important incentive and 
financing properties. First the project IRR is not very much affected if it is only in the longer term that the 
lower prices will be effective compared to restricting the sales prices at lower level already at the initiation 
point. In this way the objective of more equal price setting between rural and urban areas in the longer 
term can be achieved, without compromising the profitability of the project.  With the high estimate for 
sales the IRR will only be reduced from 53.4% to 50.1% with a reduction of the sales tariff off 50% to 0.15 
USD per kWh. The advantage is based on the private high discount rate and the high initial allowed sales 
price would benefit the project. Also the incentives for having an efficient construction and implementation 
phase to exploit the high initial allowed salesprice is important. The prospect of falling electricity prices will 
also allow households and small-scale businesses to plan for future activities based on utilizing electrical 
equipment.    
However it is quite unrealistic that the price changes should not influence the sales volumes – just as the 
sensitivity figures giving IRR as a function of sales and sales prices exclude the effect of prices on volume.  
The high initial price could alternatively be justified by allowing to finance the mini-grid and connection of 
households.  
 
On grid generation example   
Buy back rates, small IPP’s and renewables is important to address and can be crucial to the investment 
decisions of relatively small consumers that would engage in small-scale generation mainly with the 
purpose of securing their affordable electricity consumption but with a high degree of variation in their 
load or production.  
One option that would favour such small renewable producers is the principle of exchanging power at 
equal rates with a large distributor on a larger grid. That is the power production from the small plant is 
paid the same, whatever the time of use and supply pattern for this customer is. Net metering would be one 
option but this could be combined with restrictions on the duration and timing of the net flows to have tis 
equal pricing. 
The larger the production to demand of this customer and the more production is out of phase with demand 
the more problematic will this equal pricing principle be. For small generators on large grid with flexible 
resources as hydropower this is a possible option without harming the entire grid and generation system. 
Based on the feasibility study of a 1MW husk fired facility some additional sensitivity assumptions can be 
carried out to illustrate the different tariff assumptions regarding this buy back tariff or in this case more 
  
 
 
             
like a feed-in tariff. In this case that is adding a new rice husk fired facility it important to address the 
potential of allowing to supply the area at tariffs different from the EDC tariffs even thought the 
cogeneration facility is connected to the EDC grid. An agreement with EDC to take all excess production 
from the plant at low tariffs e.g. 7 US cent/kWh, could be combined with allowing the supply in the local 
area at tariffs as high as 20 US cent/kWh at end user level. This is at the low end of the assumptions in the 
case study above. It is assumed that this is attractive to consumers in the local area relative to existing 
alternatives, but this involves discrimating relative to the residential customers on the EDC grid.  
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Figure 4 Sensitivity of varying local sale share of generation at 20 US cent/kWh to end users and feed in tariff 
to EDC at lower price levels 
 
This assumption is addressed by the sensitivity analysis assuming that a price of 20 US cent/kWh sold to 
customers on a local grid can be approved. It is assumed that this involves no additional cost tp grid 
investments. The share of the fixed annual generation assumed to be sold to local customers is then varied 
between 20% and 65%. At the same time prices obtained from selling the excess production to the overall 
grid is varied from 5-9 US cent/kWh giving the three lines in  Figure 4. 
The profitability as measured by the IRR is quite sensitive to this price assumption if the majority of 
generation is to be fed to the large grid. If it is only the excess production for example 50% that is fed to 
the large grid then the sensitivity becomes smaller and IRR is only reduced around 6% points by reducding 
the feed-in tariff from 0.09 USD/kWh to 0.05 USD/kWh.   
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Figure 5 Revenue simulation with local sales 
 
In Figure 5 the revenue from sales at the two different markets are given under the same assumptions as 
above. The figure shows that with the high tariff of 0.20 USD/kWh allowed as the end-user tariff this part 
would be the major source of revenue already with a 35% share of electricity sale even if the feed-in tariff 
is 0.09 USD/kWh.  The total is the sum of the dotted line and the three coloured lines. Local tariff is 
assumed unaffected of different feed-in tariff levels. 
8 OTHER fiscal and financial measures to promote RURAL RE and the 
implications for Feasibility studies  
The previous chapter examined different changes in assumptions regarding end-user sales tariffs, volumes 
and feed-in tariffs. In the report “Markets, Policies and Institutions” a number of other incentives and 
policies have been mentioned. Subsidies have been discussed in relation to tariff subsidies and alternatives 
but there a broader fiscal and financial measures not touched apon above. 
Some broad categories are: 
Investment incentives and subsidies 
• Tax holidays and tax exemption 
• Favourable depreciation allowance 
• Import duties reduction for RE equipment 
• Long term exclusive distribution license with favourable approved tariffs 
• Investment subsidies for RE projects – grant for minigrid investment or part of generation 
equipment   
• Soft loans or state guarantied loans to overcome the high financing costs 
• Reducing costs of obtaining a license (license fee and professional assistance) 
 
Starting with the tax holiday/exemptions theese are not very efficient for RE projects because these 
projects often has a cash flow profile generating only the profit in the longer term. The depreciation off off 
  
 
 
             
the large initial investment will postpone the time that a taxable profit is earned and therefore the tax 
holiday should be very long to be effectively an incentive. 
Import duties exemption in the RE equipment could be given as this is productive infrastructure investment 
that at the same time is saving foreign currency by reducing imports in the form of fossil fuel (diesel, fuel 
oil). 
The conditions regarding the license can be very important for RE projects as they are generally dependent 
on a long project cycle and therefore exposed to long term revenue uncertainty. So both high tariff allowed 
and some exclusive rights to distribution within an area can reduce uncertainty remarkably, but at the costs 
of increasing competition and reducing tariffs.  
Production and input subsidies 
• Feed-in tariffs above conventional generation costs 
• Output-based subsidy 
• Subsidies targeting the input use – labour costs – biomass costs 
Feed-in tariffs can be an effective way of promoting RE but this is only targeting the effectiveness of 
production. If the distribution is just as important as will often be the case with rural electricification the 
some more end-user oriented incentives can prove more effeictive. Feed-in tariffs are mostly used 
uniformly so that one technology is given the same subsidy independent of the location. This is not 
appropriate for Cambodia and the rural electrification where exploitation of local resources are much more 
valuable where it will generate and replace non-existent or very expensive generation. However, it is 
generally advicable to secure that connection can be established at low costs if the RE facility is located 
close to the main grid and that a fixed feed-in tariff is in place. It is not necessary to have time dependent 
feed-in tariffs unless the generation share from RE becomes quite high in the main grid.  
Subsidising output can also be implemented in local grid with fluctuating demand. Here not the output, but 
the demand is determining the subsidy even though the subsidy is paid to the generator. Other ways of 
subsidising output can be subsidisation of output at peak hours based on availability performance. 
Additional to this some premiums can be given for reaching some local target for generation efficiency etc. 
In case of uncertainty regarding the for example the biomass resource intended for use in generation there 
is the additional option of subsidising the collection and purchase of this resource. The advantage of this is 
that it might secure an unreliable biomass resource and it might create employment and income as well in 
the local area.   
 
  
 
 
